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Native Grassland Conversion: the Roles of Risk  
Intervention and Switching Costs 
 
 
Abstract 
We develop a real option model of the irreversible native grassland conversion decision. Upon 
plowing, native grassland can be followed by either a permanent cropping system or a system 
in which land is put under cropping (respectively, grazing) whenever crop prices are high 
(respectively, low). Switching costs are incurred upon alternating between cropping and 
grazing. The effects of risk intervention in the form of crop insurance subsidies are studied, as 
are the effects of cropping innovations that reduce switching costs. We calibrate the model by 
using cropping return data for South Central North Dakota from 1989 to 2012. Simulations 
show that a risk intervention that offsets 20% of a cropping return shortfall increases the sod-
busting cost threshold, below which native sod will be busted, by 41% (or $43.7/acre). 
Omitting cropping return risk across time underestimates this sod-busting cost threshold by 
23% (or $24.35/acre), and hence underestimates the native sod conversion caused by crop 
production. 
 
JEL Classification: Q18, Q38, H23 
Keywords: conservation tillage, crop insurance policy, irreversibility, native grassland, 
sodbusting. 
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Native Grassland Conversion: the Roles of Risk  
Intervention and Switching Costs 
 
“So when, to-day, on the homestead, 
We finished the virgin sod, 
Is it strange I almost regretted 
To have marred that work of God?”   
Rudolf Ruste, 1925, “The Last of the Virgin Sod.” 
 
In 1830 the U.S. prairie ecosystem was intact and extended from Indiana to the Rockies. Soils 
in the eastern tall grass prairie region are generally very fertile while the region’s climate 
favors cropping. Westward expansion, together with the advent of the steel moldboard plow, 
tile drainage innovations and strong product demand ensured rapid conversion. By 1950, native 
grasslands in Illinois, Iowa, Southern Minnesota, and Northern Missouri had almost vanished, 
while much had also disappeared further west. Conversion continued in the western Prairie 
states over the latter half of the twentieth century, but the rate was not such as to attract 
widespread attention. Data are scarce but a variety of evidence suggests that the rate of native 
grassland conversion has increased markedly since the 1990s.  
The prairie ecosystem is home to many species that are at risk to habitat loss. Much of the 
North American duck population nests in grasslands just east of the Missouri waterway, at the 
western fringe of the Corn Belt. Sprague’s Pipit (Anthus spragueii) is a migratory songbird that 
nests primarily in northern plains native grasslands. It is a candidate for endangered species 
listing, and habitat loss has led to its disappearance from eastern parts of its historical breeding 
range. The Dakota Skipper butterfly (Hesperia dacotae) also has candidate status in the U.S.  
for listing as an endangered species. Presumed to have disappeared out of Illinois and Iowa it is 
one of many lepidopterans in the region that are of concern. It thrives best in non-shrubby post-
fire prairie and so relocates and repopulates. In increasingly fragmented prairie, permanent 
disappearance from remaining tracts is likely as there is no amenable habitat to go to or return 
from upon prairie disturbance.  
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Stephens et al. (2008) calculated a 0.4% per year native grassland conversion rate in the 
period from 1989 to 2003 based on satellite data for parts of the 9,122 square mile Missouri 
Coteau portion of the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR). Farm Service Agency data for the Dakotas 
identified the cultivation of 450,000 acres of native grassland during 2002–2007. Rashford, 
Walker, and Bastian (2011) used National Resource Inventory data on non-cultivated land and 
cultivated land over 1979–80 through 1996–97. The study area is the 183 counties in the PPR 
stretching from Iowa and Minnesota through to Montana. Rashford, Walker, and Bastian 
anticipate that about 30 million acres of grassland (native or not) would be converted to 
cropping in the period from 2006 to 2011 given the market environment pertaining during that 
period. This conversion rate is slightly more than 1% per year. Johnston (2012) used remotely 
sensed National Land Cover Cropland Data Layer across the part of the PPR within the 
Dakotas. She found that 4,840 square miles of grassland (native or not) between 2001 and 2010 
had been converted to cropping, representing 16.9% of grassland coverage in 2001. By using 
land-use data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service Cropland Data Layer, Wright 
and Wimberly (forthcoming) estimated that during 2006–2011 about 2 million acres of 
grassland had been converted to corn and soybean production in the western Corn Belt. If 
conversion from cropland to grassland is taken into account, then the net loss of grassland in 
this area was 1.3 million acres from 2006 to 2011.   
Changes in the economic environment and available technology set may rationalize 
increased conversion. Regarding technology, drought tolerant corn and soybean varieties have 
removed one of the main obstacles to producing these crops in the western prairies (Yu and 
Babcock 2010; Tollefson 2011). Herbicide-tolerant and pest-resistant corn and soybean 
varieties have reduced chemical, labor, machine and management time requirements as well as 
allowing growers to expand the growing season by planting when conditions allow. For 
example the USDA’s estimate of usual planting dates for corn in North Dakota was given as 
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May 13–26 in 1997, but as May 2–28 in 2010; while the window for South Dakota was May 
9–25 in 1997, but was May 2–27 in 2010 (USDA 1997, 2010). Badh et al. (2009) have found 
that the last frost to first frost growing season has increased by about one day per decade from 
1879 to 2008 in North Dakota. Kucharik (2006, 2008) has confirmed a trend toward earlier 
average corn planting dates in the greater Corn Belt, and has ascribed a large fraction of trend 
yield growth to this shift toward earlier planting, increasing the attractiveness of crop 
production at any given price levels relative to grass-based production. 
Other innovations of relevance include weed control that would reduce the costs of (a) 
converting native grassland, and (b) switching between crop production and grass-based 
farming subsequent to any conversion. Many soils in the Dakotas are prone to erosion and do 
not fare well under conventional tillage. The advent of atrazine, glyphosate and other 
herbicides since the 1960s has reduced the need for extensive cultivation when cropping 
(Triplett and Dick 2008), when rotating pasture with cropping, and when breaking virgin sod. 
Herbicide-resistant seed has further reduced the costs of cropping. In addition, these 
technologies likely have reduced the costs of compliance with the sodbuster provision 
introduced in the 1985 farm bill when a farmer contemplates converting highly erodible land.  
United States farm-level prices for the major crops moved sharply above trend levels in 
2006 and have remained 50% or more above the 1990–2006 average in the years 2007–2012. 
While the causes are in dispute, evidence suggests that renewable fuel use mandates put in 
place after the Energy Policy Act of 2005, coupled with strong emerging market demand for 
both energy and feedstock, are at least partly responsible (Enders and Holt 2012).  
In the shorter-run, intensive margin responses to higher output prices are limited. For 
example, response to the most important non-seed input, nitrogen, is viewed as being concave 
with a plateau at nitrogen levels moderately above commercial applications (Setiyono et al. 
2011). Expansion to meet demand needs to come from either long-run technical change or 
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extensive margin adjustments. Growth in crop trend yield has not exceeded 2% for any of corn, 
wheat, or soybeans in the years 1960–2007, see Table S1 in Alston, Beddow, and Pardey 
(2009). Although high output prices increase the incentive to conduct yield improvement 
research, a meaningful trend yield growth response will likely take many years.  
Both the market environment and aforementioned technical innovations suggest that much of 
the additional land for corn will come at the parched western fringe of the Corn Belt through 
converting grass and wheat land to a corn-soybean rotation in the Dakotas. Corn acres planted in 
South Dakota have increased from 4.5 million acres in 2006 to 5.2 million acres in 2011 while the 
corresponding figures in North Dakota are 1.69 million acres and 2.23 million acres, according to 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) data. 
Our interest is in how U.S. commodity risk management policies might affect conversion. 
Since 1980, use of crop yield insurance, and more recently revenue insurance, has grown 
rapidly across all major U.S. crop sectors. The growth in use has been accompanied by 
increasingly generous premium, administrative cost, and underwriting subsidies that amounted 
to about $7 billion per year over the period 2005–2009 (Smith 2011). By 2012, maintaining 
and strengthening crop insurance policy was being viewed as among the U.S. farm lobby’s 
main priorities (Glauber 2013). A prominent feature of the subsidies provided is that they are 
in proportion to premium. For example, if a grower elects to insure yield losses below 75% of 
reference yield then, as of 2012, the government pays 55% of the computed premium.  
If the expected value of random yield y  is y  and coverage level is  , then yield shortfall 
is given as max[ ,0]y y  , a convex function of random yield. To the extent that the premium 
reflects the yield shortfall, a mean-preserving spread in yield will increase premium and so will 
increase the premium subsidy; that is, premium subsidy increases with yield riskiness. In light 
of poorer soils and aridity, production risk is generally viewed as greater on the Great Plains 
when compared with the Corn Belt (Shields 2010). Thus, a concern has long been that 
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premium subsidies incentivize the decision to convert land from either virgin sod or previously 
cultivated grass-based agriculture to row crop production.  
A recent effort to address the concern was the inclusion of the “Sodsaver” provision in the 
2008 farm bill. This provision applies only to the Prairie Pothole states of Iowa, Minnesota, 
Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and is implemented in a state only upon request by 
the state’s governor. The provision disallows crop insurance coverage for land converted from 
native sod for the “first five years of planting,” where coverage was typically proscribed for the 
first year in any case. Eligibility for the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Program (SURE) 
requires federal crop insurance uptake, so Sodsaver also precludes these program benefits. As 
of 2012, no state governor has sought to invoke the provision. 
Many studies have examined the impacts of government payments on land use decisions. A 
few of these focused specifically on federal crop insurance programs (Young, Vandeveer, and 
Schnepf 2001; Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal 2004; Lubowski et al. 2006; Stubbs 2007; GAO 
2007). Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004) represents the consensus that while crop insurance 
subsidies do incentivize cropping, the effect is not large. These works referred to an environment 
in which lower subsidies were provided than those provided since 2000, while the level of 
analysis was aggregated. More recent work by Claassen, Cooper, and Carriazo (2011) sought to 
provide farm-level analysis of a wide suite of farm programs, while Claassen et al. (2011) has 
focused on the role of Sodsaver. It should be noted that, in addition to yield risk effects, the value 
of crop insurance subsidies increase in direct proportion to the overall output price level. Thus, a 
further distinction between these latter pair of studies and earlier work was treatment of the 
higher overall price environment since about 2006. Notwithstanding, the findings were similar—
while insurance subsidies did have an impact the effect was not very large. 
We too are interested in understanding the incentive to convert, especially in regard to any 
role of risk market policy interventions. Unlike all of the literature above, however, we will take 
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a dynamic perspective. Further, our concern is not at all with how risk management policy 
interventions change the trade-off between high utility states of nature and low utility states of 
nature, although we do not deny that such benefits may motivate behavioral change. Our interest 
is in exploring a very different and, as far as we know, hitherto unmentioned channel through 
which crop insurance interventions could affect land use choices.  
Specifically, we note that there are investment costs associated with both breaking native sod 
and converting between improved grassland and cropping. The magnitudes of these costs vary with 
the land at issue, but can be quite large. Technology has affected these conversion and switching 
costs. In addition, the incentive to incur these costs arises from the crop market environment. The 
more turbulent the returns the less inclined a grower should be to make costly investments that they 
might subsequently regret were cropping to suddenly become less profitable. Our intent is to build 
and simulate an asset valuation model that articulates incentives arising from cultivation 
innovations and changes in the crop production risk management policy environment.  
Related literature exists on how incentives affect land quality dynamics. In a seminal paper, 
McConnell (1983) provided a capital valuation model of soil erosion dynamics. Hertzler (1990) 
developed this class of model for the study of how crops in rotation consume and restore fertility, 
but did not introduce switching costs. Willassen (2004) introduced a switching cost into a model 
of rotating through fallow and cropping. Doole and Hertzler (2011) introduced switching costs 
into a continuous time model in which crop input choice variables can also adjust over time 
subject to constraints on land quality dynamics. Hennessy (2006) introduced an essentially static 
model of crop rotation choice, where neither adjustment costs nor price randomness arise.  
The present model is grounded in the real options line of models that seek to understand 
incentives for one-time capital investments in the presence of uncertainty about the level of 
returns they generate (Dixit 1989; Trigeorgis 1996). There are two states of market environment, 
namely high and low cropping returns. The owner of virgin sod must incur a one-time cost to 
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convert, including deep cultivation, stone picking, removing brush, and applying herbicide 
treatments, and may do so if the crop market environment is sufficiently attractive relative to the 
grass-based agriculture market environment. Thereafter, the owner can choose to switch back 
and forth between cropping and grass-based agriculture, but these switches may also involve 
costs. If conversion or subsequent switching costs are large, then the owner seeking to maximize 
the expected net present value of profits may choose not to convert in the first place.  
Crop insurance policy is relevant because a subsidized intervention pulls low cropping 
returns outcomes up toward high returns outcomes. This reduces the likelihood that a 
grower will find it optimal to switch at later time points, and so increases the expected profit 
from conversion. The owner foresees this and is all the more likely to convert. Technology 
innovations are also relevant to the extent that they reduce switching costs and will allow 
the operator to more readily switch upon conversion. When compared with the effects of a 
crop insurance subsidy intervention, the nature of the subsequent cropping behavior would 
differ under technology innovations. A more opportunistic alternating system would be 
supported rather than permanent cropping; however, both effects would increase the 
incentive to convert.  
Our paper is presented consistent with the two-stage backward induction approach taken 
during analysis. In stage 2, which is presented first, the model is posed assuming that the land 
has been converted. Land valuations are developed for both a permanent cropping system and a 
cropping system in which switching occurs, and we consider when each system will be chosen. 
We then step back to stage 1 and ask whether land with given one-time conversion costs would 
be converted in light of the profit environment and system choices available were conversion to 
occur. The model is then calibrated with reference to available data on cropping opportunities in 
South Central North Dakota. The last section concludes. 
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Modeling Cropping System Choice 
The setting is a two-stage decision game against nature. In the first stage the decision to 
convert land, or bust sod, is made. The second stage involves the choice among cropping 
systems. Both decisions are made with rational foresight over the future and necessitate 
modeling of crop profit environments.  
The basic second-stage model setup involves the existence of crop profitability regimes, 
low, l, and high, h. State change occurs in a Markovian continuous time setting, see Section 3.2 
in Hoel, Port, and Stone (1972). The constant hazard rate for transitioning from l to h is a , 
while that for transitioning from h to l is .b  Here, 0   is a scaling parameter to allow for 
increasing flux between the two states. The long-run equilibrium probability of being in states l 
and h are / ( )b a b  and / ( )a a b , respectively, and are unaffected by scaling parameter  . 
However,   should influence economic choices for two reasons. First, the present value of 
being in state h will be higher whenever   is low, as the present regime can be viewed as 
being more persistent, and price persistence over time characterizes commodity markets 
(Deaton and Laroque 1992; Ghoshray 2013). Second, if there are opportunities to adjust to 
states by changing cropping choices, but at some adjustment cost, then a low value of   will 
be preferred because it would reflect persistence in the decision environment—less need to 
adjust (i.e., incur switching costs), and so greater return on adjustment costs incurred.  
Conversion and switching costs are as follows. There is a one-time sod-busting conversion 
cost of amount  , which may differ across tracts of native grassland. The distribution is given 
by ( ) :[ , ] [0,1]F    , where   and   are the lower bound and upper bound of  , 
respectively. For land that that has been cropped, the cost of switching from cropping to 
grazing is given by cg , while that of switching from grazing to cropping is given by gc . We 
assume that cg  and gc  are common across units. 
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In the second stage, the grower can choose an action between cropping and grazing under 
state h or state l. Let gR  denote the net revenues flow from grazing in both states h and l.
1 
When the land has not been converted then returns are just gR  (i.e., we simplify in 
assuming that returns to grazing are the same under conversion as absent conversion). Let 
,c hR  and ,c lR  denote net revenue flows from cropping in states h and l, respectively. To 
represent a lower net return in state l, we let , ,c l c hR R   , where 0   is a constant. It 
is reasonable to assume that , .c h gR R  We also assume that ,g c lR R , and our rationale is 
as follows. Were ,c l gR R , then the grower would also prefer cropping in state l, and 
profits from cropping would dominate those from grass-based production in both states of 
nature. The policy concerns we are inquiring about regard marginal land rather than the 
fertile cropland where cropping is always profitable. The continuous time interest rate is 
given as r . 
Based on the assumptions about the returns under each state and action, we can readily 
check that sod busting only occurs in state h. This is because with the option to bust native sod 
at any time, a landowner who busts sod under state l will receive a lower return than that from 
grazing, while also incurring a sod-busting cost. Moreover, were conversion profitable in state 
l, then the land would not be marginal for conversion and would have long since been cropped. 
We also show that once sod is busted the land owner will follow either a ‘crop always’ system 
or an ‘alternate’ system, where in the ‘crop always’ system the land owner crops under both 
states h and l; and in the ‘alternate’ system the land owner crops under state h but grazes under 
state l. The proof is presented in Item A of Supplemental Materials. In the remainder of this 
                                                 
1For simplicity, we assume that the net revenues flow from grazing in states h and l are the same. Relaxing this 
assumption will not extract extra insight from the article, but will complicate model exposition and analysis.  
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section we identify and compare returns from the two systems. For notational consistency, we 
denote native sod as the ‘graze always’ system.  
 
‘Crop always’ System 
We first establish the state-conditioned value of land when the land is cropped in all states. The 
valuation model is continuous-time with t as time, and present time given by 0t  . Refer to the 
value of land under ‘crop always’ (or ca) when in states h and l as ( ;ca)h  and ( ;ca)l , 
respectively.  
Appendix A shows that the system solves as 
(1) , , ( )( ;ca) ; ( ;ca) ; .c h c h
R Rb r bh l u r a b
r ru r ru
               
Observe that ,lim ( ;ca) lim ( ;ca) / / [ ( )]c hh l R r b r a b         . So, as state 
persistence vanishes, then the difference between state dependent values also vanishes: 
(2) ( ;ca) ( ;ca) ,h l
u
    
which is decreasing in the value of  . The intuition is that the additional value of being in state 
h, rather than state l, decreases as the rate of flux increases. 
Notice too that the long-run variance in profit is  
(3) 
2 2 2
, , , ,
, , 2
( ) ( )
,
( )
c h c h c h c h
c h c h
aR b R aR b Ra b abR R
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
                          
which is independent of  . Persistence reduces short-run variability in profit but not long-run 
variability in profit. 
 
‘Alternate’ System 
If, instead of ‘crop always,’ the grower alternates over to grazing (i.e., puts land under pasture) 
whenever the state is low, then two modifications to the context occur. Returns to grazing 
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replace returns to cropping while conversion costs are incurred. Upon analysis provided in 
Appendix B, we obtain  
(4) 
2
,
2
,
(
( ;alt) ( ;ca) ;
( )( )
( ;alt) ( ;ca
)
)
( )
.
) (cg gc g c l
cg lc g cg
ab R
h h
ru
ab r R R
l
b r a b R
a r
l
u
b b
r
     
     
   

  
      
 
Here state h revenue is reduced by amount cgb   to reflect the expected cost of switching into 
grazing, while state l revenue is reduced by amount gca   for the same reason.  
Observe that when the l state cropping returns and grazing returns are the same, or gR   
,c hR  , then  
(5) 
2( )
( ;ca) ( ;alt) ;gc cg gc
a ab
l l
u ru
          
or, in other words, the gap between the two depends only on the expected present value of 
pasture establishment and termination costs saved.  
Which system? 
It is the state l present value that matters when choosing between cropping systems in stage 
two. This is because only in state l do benefits from avoiding cropping at a loss arise under the 
‘alternate’ system. When the exogenous environment state becomes l then the grower faces the 
choice between converting to grass or remaining in cropping, and so effectively the choice 
between the two systems. We define  
(6) 
ca-alt
2
,
( ;ca) ( ;alt)
( )( ) ( )
        .
l
c h g gc cg gc
cg
cg
l l
r b R R a ab
ru u ru
 

    
   
      

 
Whenever ca-alt 0
l  , then in state l the grower remains in cropping. Why does the cost of 
switching from cropping to pasture, ,cg  arise in the first line of eqn. (6)? This cost will be 
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incurred in state l upon switching from the ‘crop always’ system to the ‘alternate’ system (i.e., 
from having value ( ;ca)l  to having value ( ;alt)l ). Of course, the decision between the two 
systems tilts toward ‘crop always’ whenever any of the switching cost or state of flux 
parameters,  , increase. Writing  
(7) ,ˆ ( ,)c h g cggcR a r aR          
as the breakeven   satisfying ca-alt 0,l   we can state that ‘crop always’ is preferred among the 
two choices whenever ˆ  .2 From eqn. (7) it is immediate that an increase in any of
,{ , , , , }c h gc cgR a    or a decrease in gR , increases ˆ , and hence expands the set of circumstances 
under which ‘crop always’ is preferred over ‘alternate,’ given that sod has been busted. 
 
Sod-busting Incentives 
In our model, sod-busting occurs whenever the expected increase in net present value of profit to 
be had upon converting exceeds the conversion cost. This of course depends on the second-stage 
choice. It is state h present value that matters when making a non-trivial conversion decision 
because, as discussed in the previous section, sod-busting only occurs in state h. In this section 
we quantify sod-busting incentives and study factors that influence these incentives. 
 
Under ‘Crop Always’ System 
The native sod ‘graze always’ system has the value /gR r . When ˆ  , then the choice facing 
the land owner contemplating irreversible conversion of native sod in state h will be between 
‘graze always’ and ‘crop always.’ The difference between expected benefits and expected costs 
is given by  
                                                 
2 By eqn. (4) one can readily check that a comparison of ( ;ca)h  with ( ;alt)h  generates the same breakeven 
  as in eqn. (7). This confirms that the optimal choice regarding cropping system to be made in state h is time-
consistent.  
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(8) ,ca-con ( ;ca) .
g c h gh R R R bh
r r ru
           
Define caˆ  as the value of   that sets ca-con 0h  . For caˆ   then conversion occurs when 
‘crop always’ is the preferred cropping system. 
Notice that 
ca-con 0
caˆ / | / ( ) 0h b ru        , and also that  
(9) ,ˆca-con
( )( ) [ ( ) ]
| .c h g gc cgh
R R r a b a r a
ru 
      
      
 
The left part of Figure 1 characterizes equation set (8) and (9) in the ( , )   plane. As the value 
of   increases the breakeven value of   declines because the expected value of ‘crop always’ 
declines. Above line ca-con 0
h   the choice is to keep land in native sod, or graze always, and 
below the line the choice is the ‘crop always’ system. 
 
Under ‘Alternate’ System 
When ˆ   then the choice facing the land owner contemplating irreversible conversion of 
native sod in state h will be between ‘graze always’ and ‘alternate.’ The difference between 
values is given by  
(10) 
2
,
alt-con
( )( )
( ;alt) ,g c h g cg gch
R r a R R b ab
h
r ru
                
where ( ;alt)h  is provided in (B5) of the appendix. We write altˆ  as the breakeven  , such 
that alt-con 0
h  . When altˆ   then conversion occurs. Here we see that altˆ  does not depend 
on  , as the ‘alternate’ system allows the farmer to avoid low revenue cropping environments.  
We note for future reference that 1 2 1alt-con / / ( )
h
cgd d bu ab ru u           
2
alt-con alt-con/ / / ( ) 0
h h
gc gcd d d d ab ru        . The relationship will be useful when 
interpreting graphs. 
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We have already provided a graphical depiction of sod-busting decisions in ˆ( , )   space 
where eqn. (8) allows for a characterization of the critical value when ˆ  . Now we seek to 
learn how the critical value of ˆ  changes either side of ˆ  . This will allow us to complete 
the characterization of optimal sod-busting choices in ˆ( , )   space, and so provide insights on 
how policies regarding   affect conversion incentives.  
When comparing the breakeven sod-busting cost   in the two systems we obtain 
(11) 
ca alt ,
ˆ
2
,
( )( ) [ˆ ( ) ]|
( )( )
.
ˆ
0
c h g gc cg
c h g cg gc
R R r a b a r a
ru
r a R R b ab
ru
 
     
    
 
     
    
 
So for the   at which there is indifference between second-stage cropping choices, then the 
breakeven sod-busting costs are equal in the ‘crop always’ system and in the ‘alternate’ system. 
This is quite intuitive in that whenever the land values under ‘crop always’ and ‘alternate’ 
systems are equal, then the magnitude of sod-busting costs that trigger grassland conversion 
under the two systems are also equal. Figure 1 depicts continuity along the boundary of the 
( , )   set for which native sod is not broken, and eqn. (11) ensures that ˆca alt|ˆ ˆ    . How the 
kink point in Figure 1, caˆ ˆ( ),  , changes with policy interventions will be discussed below. 
 
Effects of Risk Intervention 
Now suppose that the government agrees to absorb (“abs” for short) fraction (0,1)   of crop 
revenue shortfall below ,c hR . It could do so through revenue insurance, for which subsidies are 
presently available on all the major field crops grown in the United States, see Shields (2010) 
for details. In that case ,, (1 )c h
abs
c lR R      while (7) and (8) are mapped as follows: 
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(12) ,
(ˆ
1
)
,ˆc h g gc cgabs
aR R a r    
       
(13) ,,absca-con ca-con
(1 ) .c h gh h
R R b
r ru
         
 
However alt-con
h  is unaffected because   does not arise in eqn. (10) or, perhaps stated more 
intuitively, because  , does not appear in the ‘alternate’ system cropping return for state l. See 
(B5) in the Appendix.  
Figure 2 depicts a risk intervention’s impact on stage 1 conversion choices. When fraction 
  of crop revenue shortfall   is absorbed by a subsidized crop insurance program, then the 
ca-con 0
h   line will tilt upward, while the left end of the line remains fixed at point 
,(0,( ) / )c h gR R r  in ( , )   space. Since alt-conh  is unaffected by this reduction in revenue 
shortfall, the alt-con 0
h   line is not affected, except that its left-most point shifts rightward to 
absˆ  . For a given parcel of native sod, when absˆ  , then crop insurance subsidies do not 
affect sod busting. This is because when   is very high then the converted land will be under 
the ‘alternate’ system and risk intervention does not matter. When absˆ   then the risk 
intervention does increase sod busting (i.e., for that value of   the set of   values under 
native sod contracts). The extent of the impact is given by the probability measure, according 
to ( )F  , of the vertical difference between the solid line and the dotted line valued at  .  
Suppose now that we extend native sod’s distribution into two dimensions to include both 
sod-busting costs and cropping return shortfalls (i.e., ( ) :[ ], , [ , ] [0,1]F        ). Then the 
impact of the risk management policy is given in Figure 2 and land tracts amounting to the 
probability measures of areas A and B become open to conversion; that is, land tracts with 
higher conversion costs become open to conversion. All of these tracts convert to ‘crop 
always,’ where wedge A converts from native sod. Observe here that the area of triangle A 
16 
 
scales up in proportion to the value of absˆ ˆ  , its base. In addition, from 
(14) abs
ˆˆ ˆ ,
1
      
together with the calculation 2 2 3[ / (1 )] / 2(1 ) 0d d        , it is clear that area A is convex 
in subsidy parameter  . Consider when 0.3   so that / (1 ) 3 / 7   . If scaling parameter   
doubles to 0.6, which is typical for U.S. revenue insurance subsidies, then / (1 ) 1.5   . So a 
doubling of the risk intervention increases area A by factor 1.5 / (3 / 7) 3.5 , or by 250%.  
Area B in parameter space ( , )   converts from ‘alternate’ to ‘crop always.’ This area is also 
proportional to absˆ ˆ  , and so convex in subsidy parameter  . This simple arithmetic on how 
sensitive conversion incentives for native sod and other grasslands can be to a change in crop 
insurance subsidies should underline the gravity of the need for empirical inquiry into the issue. 
 
Effects of a Change in Switching Costs 
Market events and technological innovations have reduced the costs of switching land in recent 
times. In particular broad-spectrum herbicide Roundup® (glyphosate) was first marketed in 
1976. Glyphosate kills most growing plants upon contact and so reduces the need for costly 
mechanical cultivation as a means of weed control. It has been off-patent since 2000 and its 
price declined by about 40% in the United States during patent protection phase-out (Nail, 
Young, and Schillinger 2007; Duke and Powles 2009). The chemical’s increasing availability 
can be interpreted as reducing the values of gc  and cg  in our model. We inquire into how 
our model suggests this would affect the nature of equilibrium cropping choices. 
Let the switching cost of converting from cropping to grass (i.e., cg ) decrease.3 Then eqn. 
(8) shows that the value of ca-con
h  is unaffected, as neither of the systems being compared 
                                                 
3 Qualitatively the effect of a change in gc  would be similar. 
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involves the possibility of switching crops at a later date. However, from eqn. (7), value ˆ  at 
which there is indifference between ‘crop always’ and ‘alternate’ systems decreases. This is 
because switching costs would be avoided under permanent cropping but would not be avoided 
under the ‘alternate’ system. So ‘alternate’ becomes more attractive under the lower switching 
costs. From eqn. (10), line alt-con 0
h   shifts up in ( , )   space as converting to the ‘alternate’ 
system has become more attractive relative to keeping the land in native sod.  
Figure 3 depicts how a decrease in cg  to a value cg  , that shifts the value of ˆ  down to 
ˆ   in compliance with eqn. (7), affects the critical parameters at which one would be 
indifferent between the three systems. As cg  decreases, line alt-con 0h   shifts upward and 
intersects with line ca-con 0
h   at ˆ   , where ˆ   is the value of   at which the landowner is 
indifferent between ‘crop always’ and ‘alternate’ systems under cg  , and alt   is such that 
alt-con 0
h   for land tracts with alt alt( , ]    . From area D in Figure 3, we can see that land 
tracts under native sod with ˆ    will be busted and placed in the ‘alternate’ system. The 
magnitude of this extra native sod busted is the probability measure of the vertical difference 
between the solid line and the dotted line valued at  . If ˆ   , however, a decrease in cg  
does not affect land conversion. This is because when ˆ    converted land is under ‘crop 
always,’ and cg , the switching cost from cropping to grazing, does not affect either the value 
of land under ‘crop always’ or the value of native sod. Lower switching costs will also induce 
some land to convert from ‘crop always’ to ‘alternate’ because the friction costs of alternating 
have fallen. These land tracts are represented by area C in Figure 3. 
However, one might expect that a technology that decreases switching costs between 
cropping and grazing would also reduce the one-time sod-busting cost,  . For example, as 
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mentioned at this sub-section’s outset, broad-spectrum herbicide glyphosate reduces the need 
for costly mechanical cultivation when busting native sod. If the one-time sod-busting cost 
falls reduced across all land units, then more native sod will be converted because more native 
sod has conversion cost less than the threshold sodbusting cost. Stated differently, innovations 
such as glyphosate are likely to have effects beyond those in Figure 3. They are likely to shift 
the distribution of ( )F   lower such that it is less costly to convert land of any given   value 
and so a larger mass of land tracts will fall in the ‘crop always’ and ‘alternate’ regions. 
 
A Numerical Example 
In this section, we utilize a numerical example to illustrate the intuition obtained from the 
above qualitative analysis. Model parameters can be separated into four sets. These are the 
returns parameter set R , ,{ , , }c h c l gR R R , dynamics parameter set { , , , }a b rD , friction 
parameter set F { , , },gc cg    and the single-element policy parameter set { }P . We 
discuss our choices of each in turn. Table 1 summarizes values of these parameters in the 
baseline scenario where there is no policy intervention (i.e., 0  ). Since crop prices increased 
dramatically in 2007 and thereafter, for returns parameters we calibrate two sets of values. One 
is for the period before 2007 and the other is for the period 2007–2012.  
 
Profitability Level Parameters 
Returns from cropping (i.e., ,c hR  and ,c lR ) in the period 1989–2006 are calibrated by use of 
North Dakota State University Extension annual crop budgets for the South Central North 
Dakota (SCND) region.4 The SCND region contains 11 counties: Barnes, Dickey, Eddy, 
Foster, Griggs, Kidder, LaMoure, Logan, McIntosh, Stutsman, and Wells (see the map in 
                                                 
4 Paulann Haakenson at North Dakota State University Extension Service generously shared the historical crop 
budgets with us. 
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Figure SM1 of the Supplement Materials).5 We also calibrate a second set of cropping returns 
for the 2007–2012 period, as returns on cropping starting from 2007 were so high that the 
cropping profitability clearly had entered in a new regime. From the crop budgets we collect 
returns to land, labor, and management from growing corn, soybean, and wheat in each year. 
Then we calculate a weighted average return for each year by using harvested acres in the 
South Central North Dakota region as weights. The U.S. GDP implicit price deflator is used to 
translate the returns into 2006 dollars. Returns in this article are all in 2006 dollars unless 
stated otherwise. Figure 4 depicts the weighted average returns over 1989–2012. 
Since there is no clear upward trend in returns over 1989–2006, we use the sample mean of 
the weighted average returns (i.e., $27.55/acre) as a threshold to differentiate returns in state h 
and returns in state l.6 That is, if in a year the return is higher (respectively, lower) than the 
sample mean, then we assume that state h (respectively, l) occurs in that year. By doing so we 
transform the return process over 1989–2006 to a two-state process. If we label state h as 1 and 
state l as 0, then the Dickey-Fuller test (performed by Stata command “dfgls”) rejects the null 
hypothesis that the two-state process is a unit root.7 Moreover, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test on the two-state process does not reject the hypothesis that the process 
is stationary at any reasonable significance level. We perform the same tests on the original 
return process and the test results do not reject the stationarity hypothesis either. We then define 
the simple average of returns in state h to be , ,c hR which is $42.80/acre. Similarly, we define 
average returns in state l to be , ,c lR  which is $17.85/acre. In the 2007–2012 regime, the cropping 
returns in states h and l are $85.73/acre and $45.49/acre, respectively.  
                                                 
5 In 2005 and after, the SCND was redefined to contain only 6 counties: Burleigh, Emmons, Kidder, Logan, 
McIntosh and Sheridan counties. Since a) the newly defined SCND is geographically similar to the previously 
defined SCND; and b) the redefinition occurred at the very end of our 1989-2006 regime, we assume that this 
regional redefinition does not affect the underlying data generating mechanism to the parameters.  
6 A simple ordinary least square regression of the weighted average returns on year shows that the coefficient on 
year is insignificant (with p-value at 0.28).  
7 The same results are obtained when we perform the Phillips-Perron unit-root test by using Stata command 
“pperron” and when we perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test by using Stata command “dfuller.” 
20 
 
Returns from grazing, ,gR  are calculated by using pasture cash rent in North Central South 
Dakota over 1991–2006 because pasture cash rent data in South Central North Dakota are not 
available to us.8 We first translate the cash rent into 2006 dollars and then let the returns from 
grazing, ,gR  equal the cash rent average, or $19.99/acre. In the 2007–2012 regime, returns from 
grazing equal $30.95/acre. 
 
Dynamic Parameters 
We apply maximum likelihood methods to estimate the transition probabilities between state h 
and state l based on the two-state cropping return process we have discussed above. We refer 
readers to Craig and Sendi (2002) for details about the methodology. Here we only outline the 
formula used to obtain the estimates. Suppose ijn  is the number of times that state i is followed 
by state j in the two-state return process, where ,, { }.hi lj  Then the estimated probability of 
state i being followed by state j is:  
(15) 
{ , }
,    , { , .ˆ }
ij
ij
ij
j h l
n
p
n
i j h l

   
Based on the data we calculate ˆ 0.2lhp   and 0.43ˆhlp  ; therefore, the estimated values for a  
and b  are 0.2 and 0.43, respectively. So the long-run equilibrium probability of being in states l 
and h are / ( ) 0.68b a b   and / ( ) 0.32a a b  , respectively. Based on our sample, the 
empirical probability that state l occurs is 11/18 0.61 , which is close to the long-run 
equilibrium probability. Following Claassen, Cooper, and Carriazo (2011), the interest rate is 
assumed to be 0.07r = . 
 
                                                 
8 The counties in the North Central South Dakota area are Brown, Campbell, Edmunds, Faulk, McPherson, Potter, 
Spink, and Walworth (see the map in Figure SM1 of the Supplemental Materials).  
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Friction Parameters 
The cost of sodbusting varies greatly, depending on the land at issue. It can be as low as just 
the cost of making a few herbicide application runs (Faulstich 2011), or less than $30/acre if 
the land is ideally suited. An intermediate case between bringing native sod into production 
and converting pasture to crop production is that of bringing formerly cropped Conservation 
Reserve Program land back into production. This land has typically been out of production and 
largely unmanaged for 10 years or more. Rock removal, extensive land shaping, and drainage 
would not be major issues as such land tracts would have formerly been in crop production. 
However, heavy scrub and gopher mounds may be issues, and Ransom et al. (2008) suggest 
costs in the order of $55/acre for North Dakota land, where costs are approximately equally 
divided between chemical treatment and mechanical cultivation.  
Costs may reach well beyond $100/acre when the land is new to cropping (Renner 2011). 
In addition to rock, scrub and perhaps fence removal, gulleys and gopher holes may need to be 
filled. Labor may be a significant component of cost. In this article we focus on how risk 
interventions and switching cost reductions can affect the critical value of   at which land 
value is unaffected by the sod-busting decision. Since we have very limited information on the 
distribution of  , we utilize the change in the critical value of   to roughly measure the 
grassland-conversion impact of risk interventions and switching cost reductions.  
The cost of switching from well-maintained pasture to cropping is typically not large, 
where tilling and herbicide are the most prominent parts. Therefore, we assume that gc 
$15 / acre . The cost of establishing a pasture is typically much larger. For Iowa, Barnhart 
and Duffy (2012) assert a cost of about $200/acre depending on cultivation, weed 
management, seeding and fertilization choices. For North Dakota, with generally less 
productive land, growers are not likely to pay that much, and we assume a cost of 
$120 / acrecg   for conversion.  
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Policy Parameter 
Table 2 provides premium subsidy rates that were available on the most popular government 
yield and revenue insurance contracts in 2012. Catastrophic insurance is provided free for 
losses beyond 50% of expected yield or revenue, where yield expectations are computed from 
historical yield data. Typical coverage levels chosen vary with crop and location but are 
broadly about 70% or more, such that subsidies are in the range of 38–59%. In the simulation 
we calibrate   as the ratio of crop insurance subsidy over cropping return shortfall,  . Since 
an actuarially fair insurance does not affect expected net returns, it is the crop insurance 
subsidy that matters for land-owners’ expected returns.  
The crop insurance subsidy is calculated as the average of per acre subsidy in North Dakota 
over 1989–2006, which is $4.90/acre. The state-level of crop insurance subsidy and insured 
acres over 1989–2006 is obtained from Summary of Business Reports and Data of Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) at USDA.9 We calculate that over the 1989–2006 regime  
4.9 / 24.95 0.2 . In the simulation, to check sensitivity we also vary the value of   from 0.2. 
In the 2007–2012 regime, the subsidy over cropping returns shortfall ratio is about 0.5. In the 
baseline scenario where there is no policy intervention we let 0.    
 
Simulations 
We are interested in examining how (a) implementation of a policy that directly modifies the 
cropping return shortfall,  , and (b) technology advances that reduce switching cost between 
cropping and grazing (i.e., cg  and gc ) would affect land use. Therefore, we need to identify 
how the critical values of cropping return shortfall,  , and the one-time sod-busting cost,  , 
are affected by the risk intervention policy and technology advances. Table 1 lists these critical 
                                                 
9	Link:	http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html.		
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values in the baseline scenario under which there is no policy intervention (i.e., 0  ). From 
eqn. (7), ˆ $58.21/ acre   over the 1989–2006 regime, while ˆ $90.17 / acre   over the 2007–
2012 regime. Since the baseline scenario   is $24.95/acre (respectively, $40.23/acre) under 
the 1989–2006 (respectively, 2007–2012) regime, we know that were a parcel of native sod 
converted then it would be under ‘crop always’ rather than ‘alternate’.  
In the baseline scenario, the critical value for the one-time sod-busting cost in 1989–2006 is 
$107.17/acre (Table 1), implying that native sod with one-time conversion cost lower than 
$107.17/acre will be converted into the ‘crop always’ system. In the 2007–2012 regime the 
critical value becomes $429.86/acre in the baseline scenario (Table 1). We can see that in the 
2007–2012 regime under the baseline scenario, the critical value of   is about four times as 
large as that in the 1989–2006 regime, which means that higher cropping returns in the 2007–
2012 regime significantly increases the critical values of sod-busting cost at which landowners 
are indifferent between converting and not converting. In both regimes, the critical values of   
under ‘alternate’ are negative, which means that were ˆ  , then native sod would not be 
converted even if the sod-busting cost were zero. 
Tables 3 and 4 present simulation results of critical values of   and   upon risk 
intervention and decreasing switching costs in the 1989–2006 and 2007–2012 regimes, 
respectively. There are three panels in each of Tables 3 and 4. The first column in each panel 
includes the critical values of    and   in the baseline scenario (i.e., 0  , 15gc  , and 
120cg  ). In both regimes, a risk intervention significantly increases the critical values of 
sod-busting cost. For example, consider the 1989–2006 regime. When the reduction in 
cropping returns shortfall is 20% (i.e., 0.2  , the calibrated value) then, compared with the 
baseline scenario, the critical value of sod-busting cost (i.e., caˆ ) will increase from 
$107.17/acre to $150.91/acre—a 41% increase (see Panel A of Table 3). Even a 10% reduction 
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in shortfall (i.e., 0.1  ) will increase caˆ  by 20%. The critical values of return shortfall, ˆ , 
are increased by risk intervention as well. When 0.2   and when compared with the value in 
the baseline scenario, then absˆ  increases from $58.21/acre to $72.76/acre, a 25% increase (see 
Panel B of Table 3). So the crop insurance subsidy makes it more likely that native sod will be 
converted into ‘crop always.’  
In the 2007–2012 regime, the calibrated risk intervention parameter (i.e., 0.5  ) is much 
higher than that in regime 1989–2006. When 0.5   then the absolute increase in caˆ  is as 
large as $176/acre (calculated by using 606.17 429.86  from Panel A of Table 4). However, 
in the 2007–2012 regime the calibrated risk intervention (i.e., 0.5  ) increases absˆ  by 100% 
when compared with the baseline scenario, which makes the converted native sod more likely 
under ‘crop always’ system (see Panel A of Table 4). 
On the other hand the effects of a decrease in switching costs, cg  or gc , are much smaller 
in magnitude than the effects of a risk policy adjustment. In the 1989–2006 regime, we can see 
that when the switching cost from grazing to cropping (i.e., gc ) decreases from $15/acre to 
$3/acre then (a) absˆ only decreased by $2.4/acre, and (b) the critical value of sod-busting cost 
under the ‘alternate’ system, altˆ , remains negative (see Panel B of Table 3). Regarding the 
impacts of a decrease in the cost of switching from cropping to grazing (i.e., cg ), similar 
conclusions can be made except that when cg  reaches $40/acre, then altˆ  becomes positive 
(see Panel C of Table 3). In the 2007–2012 regime the effects of decreasing switching costs are 
not significant either. When switching costs are zero (i.e., 0gc cg   ), however, then native 
sod will be converted into the ‘alternate' system under the 1989–2006 regime and into the ‘crop 
always’ system under the 2007–2012 regime (upper rows in Table 5).  
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One may be interested in the critical values of sod-busting costs when the landowner omits 
risks in cropping returns. That is, the landowner converts native sod whenever the net present 
value of long-run equilibrium expected cropping returns is greater than the sum of conversion 
cost and the net present value of grazing returns. This is of interest because studies on 
grassland conversion typically base their methodologies on this idea. Examples include 
Claassen, Cooper, and Carriazo (2011), Claassen et al. (2011), and Rashford, Walker, and 
Bastian (2011).  
The lower rows in table 5 show that in the 1989–2006 regime ca 8 82ˆ 2.   when ,c hR  and 
,c lR  are set to equal $25.79/acre, the long-run equilibrium expected cropping returns over the 
period. Clearly here the value of caˆ  is 23% (or $24.35/acre) smaller than that in the baseline 
scenario, which is $107.17/acre. In other words, omission of cropping return risk across 
periods will lead to an underestimation of the magnitude of grassland conversions. The reason 
is as follows. Sod-busting always occurs in state h. Moreover, state h will persist at time t with 
approximate probability 1 bt . Therefore, if the interest rate is greater than 0 (i.e., the 
discount factor is less than 1), then the present value of long-run equilibrium expected returns 
is less than the present value of land under the ‘crop always’ system. That is, omission of risk 
across periods will underestimate expected net returns from cropping, and hence underestimate 
the magnitude of grass conversions. Of course, if the interest rate is 0 (i.e., the discount factor 
equals 1) then the present value of long-run equilibrium expected returns is equal to the present 
value of the ‘crop always’ system. 
 
Conclusion 
Under a two-point Markov random return process, we have developed and simulated a real 
option model that articulates incentives arising from cultivation innovations and changes in the 
risk management subsidy policy environment surrounding crop production. We have shown that, 
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upon plowing, native sod is followed by either (a) a ‘crop always’ (i.e., permanent cropping) 
system, or (b) an ‘alternate’ system, in which land is put under cropping (respectively, grazing) 
whenever crop prices are high (respectively, low). We then compared the value of land under 
these two systems with the value of land under native sod having accounted for the switching 
costs incurred upon alternating between cropping and grazing. In this comparison we studied 
how (a) risk interventions, and (b) cropping innovations that reduce switching costs affect a 
landowner’s sod-busting decision. Our findings were that the presence of risk intervention likely 
converts marginal native sod to a ‘crop always’ rather than an ‘alternating’ production system. 
For land that has already been converted, a risk management intervention would increase the 
fraction of land tracts under a ‘crop always’ system while decreasing the fraction under an 
‘alternate’ system. Theoretically, cropping innovations that reduce switching costs will reduce 
the extent of native sod land tracts and land originally under a ‘crop always’ system and increase 
the extent of land under an ‘alternate’ system.  
Based on data from South Central North Dakota, the calibrated model shows that risk 
policy interventions would likely have more significant effects on native sod conversion than 
would innovations in switching costs. Consider a risk intervention that causes a 20% reduction 
in the extent to which cropping returns fall short of their potential. This intervention would 
increase the maximum (or threshold) value of the one-time sod-busting cost that an asset value 
maximizing land owner would pay by 41%, or $43.7/acre, under the 1989–2006 regime. 
Although we cannot quantify the magnitude of native sod that would be affected by this 
increase in threshold value without knowing the distribution of sod-busting costs, we believe 
that the 41% increase indicates a significant change in motivation for native sod conversion. 
Our simulation also shows that omitting cropping returns risk across time underestimates the 
threshold value of sod-busting cost by 23%, and hence underestimates the incentive for native 
sod conversion to crop production. 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we derive equation system (1). Following standard Bellman equation 
statistical methods, if one commences in state h then  
(A1) ,( ;ca) (1 ) [ | ]c h th R t rt E h     , 
where ,c hR t  is income over a small immediate time interval, 1 rt  is the locally valid 
approximation of the time discount factor, and [ | ]tE h  is the present time expectation of 
value after time increment t  given that the initial state is h.  
In turn,  
(A2) [ | ] ( ;ca) (1 ) ( ;ca)tE h bt l bt h        
where (a) ( ;ca)bt l   is the product of the approximate probability of state change and value 
under the state change, while (b) (1 ) ( ;ca)bt h   is the product of the approximate 
probability of state continuance and value under continuance. Insert (A2) into (A1) to obtain  
(A3)  ,( ;ca) (1 ) ( ;ca) (1 ) ( ;ca)c hh R t rt bt l bt h         , 
and so, upon some housekeeping,  
(A4) ,
(1 ) ( ;ca)
( ;ca) .c h
R rt b l
h
r b r bt

 
       
Taking the infinitesimal limit, so that the approximation converges to equality, we have 
(A5) , ,0
(1 ) ( ;ca) ( ;ca)
Lim c h c ht
R rt b l R b l
r b r bt r b
 
  
       , 
so that ,( ;ca) [ ( ;ca)] / ( )c hh R b l r b      , and  
(A6) ,( ;ca) [ ( ;ca) ( ;ca)].c hr h R b l h      
A similar argument can be used to establish that, upon commencing in state l, then 
(A7) ,( ;ca) [ ( ;ca) ( ;ca)].c hr l R a h l        
Now write out system (A6)-(A7) as 
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(A8) ,
,
( ;ca)
.
( ;ca)
c h
c h
Rb r b l
Rr a a h
 
 
                   
 
Invert to obtain system (1). 
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Appendix B 
In this appendix we derive equation system (4). Instead of equation (A3) and the corresponding 
equation for the l state, the state equations are  
(B1) 
 
 
,( ;alt) (1 ) [ ( ;alt) ] (1 ) ( ;alt) ;
( ;alt) (1 ) [ ( ;alt) ] (1 ) ( ;alt) .
c h cg
g gc
h R t rt bt l bt h
l R t rt at h at l
  
  
        
        
 
Here the state h value factors in ( ;alt) cgl   , because this is the value upon incurring pasture 
establishment cost cg  under state transition from h to l. The state l value factors in 
( ;alt) gch   , because the state transition from l to h involves incurring the pasture 
termination cost gc . Upon some housekeeping, we have  
(B2) 
, (1 ) [ ( ;alt) ]( ;alt) ;
(1 ) [ ( ;alt) ]
( ;alt) .
c h cg
g gc
R rt b l
h
r b r bt
R rt a h
l
r a rt a
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
Taking the infinitesimal limit in each case allows us to arrive at 
(B3) 
, ,
0
0
(1 ) [ ( ;alt) ] [ ( ;alt) ]
Lim ( ;alt);
(1 ) [ ( ;alt) ] [ ( ;alt) ]
Lim ( ;alt).
c h cg c h cg
t
g gc g gc
t
R rt b l R b l
h
r b r bt r b
R rt a h R a h
l
r a rt a r a
   
  
   
  


          
          
 
Now write out system (B3) as 
(B4) ,
( ;alt)
,
( ;alt)
c h cg
g gc
R bb r b l
R ar a a h
  
  
                     
and invert: 
(B5) 
,
,
( ) ( )( )
( ;alt) ;
( )
( )( ) ( )
( ;alt) .
( )
c h cg g gc
c h cg g gc
a R b r b R a
l
r r a b
r a R b b R a
h
r r a b
     
 
     
 
      
      
 
Then utilize equation system (1), to obtain system (4).  
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Table 2. Government Premium Subsidy Rate on Yield- and Revenue-Based Products 
(portion of premium that is paid by government) 
Coverage level Catastrophic 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
Subsidy rate 1.0 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.48 0.38 
Source: Table 1 of Shields (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Baseline Parameters and Critical Values in the Numerical Example 
Symbol Explanation 
Values 
(1989–2006) 
Values 
(2007–2012) 
,c hR  Cropping returns in state h ($/acre) 42.80 85.73 
,c lR  Cropping returns in state l ($/acre) 17.85 45.49 
  Difference, , ,c h c lR R  in ($/acre) 24.95 40.23 
Calibrated 
parameters 
gR  Grazing returns ($/acre) 19.99 30.95 
r  Interest rate 0.07  
a  Probability of transition from state l to state h 0.20  
b  Probability of transition from state h to state l 0.43  
gc  Switching cost, grazing to cropping ($/acre) 15.0  
cg  Switching cost, cropping to grazing ($/acre) 120  
  Risk policy parameter, measuring fall in   0.0  
Critical 
values 
ˆ  Threshold value of   58.21 90.17 
caˆ  Threshold value of   under cropping always 107.17 429.86 
altˆ  Threshold value of   under alternating system -184.31 -7.82 
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Table 4. Dollar Critical Values of   and   under Risk Interventions or under 
Changes in Switching Costs (2007–2012 Regime)
 Panel A: critical values of   and   when   increases 
0  (baseline) 0.45   0.50   0.55   0.60 
absˆ  90.17 163.95 180.35 200.39 225.43 
caˆ  429.86 588.54 606.17 623.80 641.43 
altˆ  -7.82 -7.82 -7.82 -7.82 -7.82 
 Panel B: critical values of   and   when gc  decreases 
15gc  (baseline) 12gc   9gc   6gc   3gc   
absˆ  90.17 89.57 88.97 88.37 87.77 
caˆ  429.86 429.86 429.86 429.86 429.86 
altˆ  -7.82 -2.56 2.70 7.95 13.21 
 Panel C: critical values of   and   when cg  decreases 
120cg  (baseline) 100cg   80cg   60cg   40cg 
absˆ  90.17 84.77 79.37 73.97 68.57 
caˆ  429.86 429.86 429.86 429.86 429.86 
altˆ  -7.82 39.51 86.83 134.16 181.49 
 
Table 3. Critical Values of   and   under Risk Interventions or under Changes in 
Switching Costs (1989–2006 Regime) 
 Panel A: critical values of   and   when   increases 
0  (baseline) 0.1   0.15   0.2   0.25 
absˆ  58.21 64.68 68.48 72.76 77.61 
caˆ  107.17 129.04 139.97 150.91 161.84 
altˆ  -184.31 -184.31 -184.31 -184.31 -184.31 
 Panel B: critical values of   and   when gc  decreases 
15gc  (baseline) 12gc   9gc   6gc   3gc   
absˆ  58.21 57.60 57.00 56.40 55.80 
caˆ  107.17 107.06 107.06 107.06 107.06 
altˆ  -184.31 -179.09 -173.84 -168.58 -163.32 
 Panel C: critical values of   and   when cg  decreases 
120cg  (baseline) 100cg   80cg   60cg   40cg 
absˆ  58.21 52.80 47.40 42.00 36.60 
caˆ  107.17 107.06 107.06 107.06 107.06 
altˆ  -184.31 -137.03 -89.70 -42.37 4.95 
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Table 5. Dollar Critical Values of   and   under No Risk (i.e., , ,c h c lR R ) or under 
Zero Switching Costs (i.e., 0gc cg   ) 
Regime ,c hR  ,c lR  gR  absˆ  caˆ  altˆ  
No switching 
cost 
1989-2006 42.80 17.85 19.99 22.81 107.17 125.94 
2007-2012 85.73 45.49 30.95 54.77 429.86 302.43 
No risk in 
Returns 
1989-2006 25.79 25.79 19.99 41.20 82.82 -278.24 
2007-2012 58.29 58.29 30.95 62.74 390.59 -159.29 
 
 
Figure 1. Sodbusting choices in (δ, θ) space
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Figure 2. Effect of risk intervention on sodbusting
choices in (δ, θ) space
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Figure 3. Effect of lower grass to crop conversion 
cost on sodbusting choices in (δ, θ) space
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Figure 4. Cropping Returns over 1989–2012 in South Central North Dakota (in 
2006 dollars) 
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Supplemental Materials 
Item A 
In this item we show that once sod is busted then the land owner will either ‘crop always’ or 
‘alternate.’ In ‘crop always’ the land owner always crops regardless of the state of nature. In 
the ‘alternate’ system the land owner crops under state h but grazes under state l. 
Let the moment when native sod is busted be denoted as time 0. At each time 0t   the 
landowner considers whether to take action ‘crop’ (labeled as c) or ‘graze’ (labeled as g), based 
on (a) the current state of nature (i.e., h and l), and (b) the current state of land use (i.e., 
cropping or grazing). The current state of land use at time t should be taken into account when 
choosing an action at time t because a switching cost will be incurred whenever the landowner 
switches land use from one type to the other. Since nature’s state change occurs in a Markovian 
continuous time setting, only the current state matters for the time t decision. Therefore, the 
landowner has sixteen strategies for choosing a land-use type at time t. Let “(i, j)  k” stand 
for “if nature’s state is { , }i h l  and if the land is currently under land-use type { , }j c g , then 
the landowner chooses land-use type { , }k c g  at time t.”  
The sixteen strategies can be written as: 
1) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  c; 
2) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  g; 
3) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  c; 
4) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  g; 
 
5) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  c; 
6) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  g; 
7) (h, c)  c, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  c; 
8)  (h, c)  c, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  g; 
 
9)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  c; 
10)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  g; 
11)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  c; 
12)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  c, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  g; 
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13)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  c; 
14)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  c, (l, g)  g; 
15)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  c; 
16)  (h, c)  g, (h, g)  g, (l, c)  g, (l, g)  g. 
Strategy 1) can be interpreted as “at time t the land owner will always put land under 
cropping, regardless of nature’s state and the current land-use type.” Strategy 2) can be 
interpreted as “If nature’s state is l and if the land is currently under grazing, then at time t the 
land owner will put the land under grazing. The land will be put under cropping under any other 
scenarios.” Other strategies can be interpreted similarly. One can readily check that strategies 9) 
through 16) are strictly dominated by the matched strategy among 1) through 8) where matching 
is in sequential order.  
For example, the only difference between strategies 1) and 9) is the action taken when facing 
(h, c). In strategy 1), when (h, c) occurs in period t then the grower takes action ‘crop’. In 
strategy 9), when (h, c) occurs in period t then the grower takes action ‘graze’, which will induce 
the switching cost from cropping to grazing, cg , and revenue loss from giving up cropping, 
,c h gR R . Moreover, taking the action ‘graze’ when facing (h, c) cannot improve future income. 
This is because the option to switch land use is always open. Therefore, in strategy 9), converting 
from cropping to grazing when facing (h, c) cannot improve future income but incurs both a cost 
and a loss in revenue in the present state. So strategy 9) is strictly dominated by strategy 1). By 
the same argument one can show that strategy 10) is strictly dominated by strategy 2) and 
generally strategy k is dominated by strategy k-8, {9,10, ... ,16}k  . Also, one can show that 
strategy 3) is strictly dominated by strategy 4), and that strategy 7) is strictly dominated by 
strategy 8). Moreover, it is readily checked that the strategy 16) is dominated by the action of not 
sod-busting in the first place.  
Therefore, we only need to consider strategies 1), 2), 4), 5), 6), and 8). Strategies 1), 2), 5), 
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and 6) are equivalent to the ‘crop always’ system. This is because sod-busting only occurs under 
state h and whenever the sod is busted then it is converted to cropland; that is, at time 0t   we 
have (h, c).  Therefore, starting from time 0t  , if the landowner follows strategies 1), 2), 5), and 
6), then ‘grazing’ will never occur in the system, which implies the ‘crop always’ system. 
Similarly, starting from time 0t   if the landowner follows strategy 4), then the land will be 
under cropping (respectively, grazing) whenever the state is h (respectively, l), which implies the 
‘alternate’ system. Were the native sod busted, then strategy 8) would never be optimal. The 
reason is as follows. If the native sod is busted, then busting is profitable when nature’s state is h. 
Suppose strategy 8) is followed after the sod is busted and suppose the system evolves to (h, g), 
or the situation in which nature’s state is h and the current land use is grazing. In this situation, 
deviating from strategy 8) (i.e., putting land under cropping) will be more profitable than 
following strategy 8) because under state h busting native sod has been profitable. Recall that the 
one-time sod-busting cost,  , is higher than the switching cost from grazing to cropping, gc . 
In sum, once native sod has been converted then we only need to consider the ‘crop always’ 
and ‘alternate’ systems. At no loss we may represent ‘crop always’ and ‘alternate’ by strategies 
1) and 4), respectively. 
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Figure SM1. South Central North Dakota (SCND) area and North 
Central South Dakota (NCSD) area
Note: * In 2005 and after, the SCND area was redefined to contain only 6 counties: Burleigh, Emmons, 
Kidder, Logan, McIntosh and Sheridan counties.)
 
 
 
 
